We derive bounds on the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences on choices in sequential two-player games without exploiting information about the (higherorder) beliefs of players. Bounds are derived for a class of belief-dependent preferences which includes reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) and guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) as special cases. We show how informative bounds can be derived by exploiting a specific invariance property common to preferences in this class. We illustrate our approach by analyzing data from a large scale experiment conducted with a sample of participants randomly drawn from the Dutch population. We find that behavior of players in the experiment is consistent with significant guilt aversion: some groups of the population are willing to pay at least 0.16e to avoid 'letting down' another player by 1e. We also find that our approach produces narrow and thus very informative bounds on the causal effect of reciprocity in the games we consider. Our bounds suggest that players have weak reciprocal preferences.
Introduction
In recent years there has been a growing interest in using belief-dependent preferences to explain experimental behavior at odds with classical assumptions about human preferences (e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) , Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2008) ).
Belief-dependent preferences capture the idea that psychological factors such as people's beliefs concerning other people's intentions and expectations affect decision making.
1 Behavior may for example be motivated by the propensity to avoid feelings of guilt which result from 'letting down' others (see e.g. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) ). Guilt averse decision makers form beliefs about what others expect in order to infer how much these persons can be and are 'let down' by their own decisions. Alternatively, behavior may be motivated by reciprocity, i.e. the propensity to react kindly to perceived kindness and unkindly to perceived unkindness (see e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) ).
Reciprocal decision makers form beliefs about the intentions of others in order to infer the (un)kindness of their behavior and behave kind to perceived kindness and unkind to perceived unkindness.
A natural approach to measure the relevance of belief-dependent preferences has been to test whether stated beliefs can predict behavior in a way consistent with a given type of belief-dependent preference. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) for example ask players to state their higher-order beliefs in a trust game. They find that stated beliefs correlate with decisions in a way predicted by models of guilt aversion. More recently, Dhaene and Bouckaert (2010) measure the relevance of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity using stated first-and second-order beliefs and find empirical support.
But recent research has suggested that the measured effect of beliefs on choices may not be causal as assumed by models of belief-dependent preferences. In particular, it has been argued that stated higher-order beliefs are correlated with preferences of players, causing a spurious correlation between stated beliefs and choices. While beliefs and preferences may be correlated for various reasons, the source of this correlation is most often attributed to the presence of consensus effects which arise when individuals believe that others feel and think like themselves. 2 Bellemare, Sebald, and Strobel (2011) empirically investigate how correlation between preferences and stated beliefs can affect the estimated willingness to pay to avoid feeling guilty of letting down another player. They estimate this correlation by jointly modeling decisions and beliefs of players in a sequential trust game. They find that correlation between preferences and stated beliefs can exaggerate the measured level of guilt aversion in a population by a factor of two. Blanco, Engelmann, Koch, and Normann (2011) analyze the interaction between preferences and beliefs in a sequential prisoner's dilemma. They exploit data from a within-subject design (with participants playing both roles) and vary the information provided to players about the play of others to separately identify the direct impact of beliefs on decisions from consensus effects. They conclude that consensus effects are the primary determinants of the observed correlation between stated beliefs and decisions. These results highlight the complexity of measuring the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences on choices when exploiting data on higherorder beliefs.
In this paper we take a different approach and ask whether researchers can learn something meaningful about the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences on choices without having to measure (higher-order) beliefs, thus avoiding all the difficulties associated with the measurement of beliefs and the spurious correlation of stated beliefs and preferences.
The answer turns out to be positive: researchers can derive and estimate meaningful closed-form expressions for the bounds of the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences on choices in sequential two-player games without exploiting information about the beliefs of players. These bounds are meaningful in the sense that they provide information on the range of values of the causal effect of specific belief-dependent preferences on choices.
In this way our approach allows to not only learn about the quantitative importance of each of the belief-dependent preferences in our class, but also to detect preferences which are only weak predictors of choices. We formally characterize conditions under which this can be done and discuss estimation and statistical inferences. We illustrate our approach by conducting an experiment to analyze the relevance of two prominent models of belief-dependent preferences: reciprocityà la Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and guilt aversionà la Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) .
We build on random utility models to interpret the decisions of players in games. 3 We specify the utility of players as a function of their own monetary payoffs, their psychological payoffs which capture their belief-dependent preferences, as well as other unobservable factors. Our main parameter of interest is the players' 'sensitivity' to belief-dependent preferences. Importantly, the belief-dependent psychological payoffs are unknown variables without information on the beliefs of players. However, they are known to lie within well defined intervals. Our empirical strategy is to determine what can be learned about the players sensitivity to belief-dependent preferences from observing the monetary payoffs and the intervals of the psychological payoffs. An immediate consequence of intervalmeasurements of the belief-dependent psychological payoffs is that the model parameters are set rather than point identified (see Manski and Tamer (2002) ). Set identification implies that a range of parameter values -the identification region -are consistent with the data given the assumed model. Of course, the informativeness of the data given the model naturally decreases with the size of the identification region. Unfortunatly, existing work has established that identification regions of the parameters of random utility models with interval measured regressors can be large and uninformative. Manski (2010) Bellemare, Kröger, and van Soest (2008) .
do impose a priori assumptions about the beliefs of players.
One of the main insights of our analysis is that several prominent belief-dependent preferences satisfy an 'invariance property' which can be exploited to produce informative bounds on their causal effect on choices. This invariance property is best described in the context of a game with two players -A and B. The invariance property holds e.g. if player
B's decision is unaffected by his belief-dependent preferences when his choice does not influence the final payoff of player A. To illustrate, suppose player B must choose between two final allocations, both of which provide player A with the same material payoff. Then, guilt aversionà la Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) predicts that player B cannot feel any guilt from letting down player A by choosing a specific allocation because player A's final payoff is independent of player B's choice. Similarly, player B cannot act reciprocally in the sense of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) if player A's payoff is independent of player B's choice. This is because player B cannot be (un)kind by providing player
A with an (below) above average payoff. It follows that our empirical strategy involves implementing a sufficiently high number of games in which the invariance property holds to identify and estimate all model parameters beside the sensitivity parameters of interest.
We discuss how this information can be exploited to obtain more informative bounds on the relevance of belief-dependent preferences.
Our application exploits data from an experiment conducted using the LISS panel, a large-scale Internet panel whose respondents form a representative sample of the Dutch population. Close to 1500 panel members completed our experiment which involved 500 payoff-wise unique games. One third of these games satisfied the payoff invariance condition discussed above. We exploit the unique features of the panel to perform inferences for different socio-economic groups, allowing us to asses the heterogeneity in belief-dependent preferences across a broad population.
Our analysis of guilt aversion suggests that the population willingness to pay to avoid letting down the other player by 1e is significantly different from zero and at least greater or equal to 0.08e. We also find that the lower bound of the willingness to pay to avoid guilt is higher for several groups of the population. In particular, we find that high educated individuals are willing to pay at least 0.14e to avoid letting down the other player by 1e, while men are willing to pay at least 0.16e to avoid letting down the other player by 1e.
Our approach also produces very narrow and thus highly informative bounds around the causal effect of reciprocity in our experiment. Our results suggest that reciprocity weakly predicts the final decisions made in our experiment for all groups of the population we consider. Surprisingly, these narrow bounds suggest that data on stated beliefs are not needed to make precise inferences on the relevance of reciprocity in our experiment.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our experiment and the data. Section 3 presents our proposed approach and details how it can be applied to the analysis of guilt aversion and reciprocity. Section 4 discusses estimation and inference and presents our main empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
The experiment

Experimental design
The experiment was run in January and February 2010 via the LISS-panel, an Internet survey panel managed by CentERdata at Tilburg University. In total 2000 members of the panel were invited to participate in the experiment involving 500 payoffwise different two-player, sequential-move games with a structure as shown in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 ] (r) . The payoffs of the games used in our experiment were generated by randomly choosing 500 payoffwise unique games from a set of similar games used in Bellemare, Sebald, and Strobel (2010) and recoding approximately 1/3 of them such that π A (l) = π A (r) in these games.
Each panel member was initially randomly assigned a role and a payoffwise unique game in the following way. First, 1500 panel members were assigned the role of player B while 500 panel members were assigned the role of player A. This role assignment allowed us to gather more decisions of B-players whose behavior is the primary focus of our analysis. Subsequently, we randomly assigned each of the 500 payoff different games to three B-players and to one A-player. In other words, each of the 500 games could potentially be played by three B-players and one A-player.
Given the infrastructure of the LISS-panel, the game was played across two consecutive survey months. In the first month, only panel members assigned to the role of player B were contacted and offered the possibility to participate in the experiment. Before revealing their role and specific game, they were provided general instructions, informed that 50 payoff-wise unique games would randomly be chosen ex-post and paid out two months later. Furthermore, they were given the possibility to withdraw from the experiment. After the revelation of their role and game, they were told that they would be making their Each player B then made his/her decision using the strategy method: B-players chose between l and r at history h 1 before knowing the decision of player A at history h 0 .
Panel members assigned to the role of player A made their decisions during the second survey months. All A-players were first provided instructions and were informed that 50 payoff-wise unique games would randomly be chosen ex-post and paid out at the completion of the experiment. Again, before revealing their roles and games, they were given the possibility to withdraw from the experiment. 328 of the 500 invited panel members accepted the invitation and completed the experiment in the role of player A.
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For each of the unique payoffwise games for which we had more than one complete set of B-players decisions, we randomly chose one of them to be used in the interaction with player A. Invited panel members who accepted to participate in the experiment were then presented their unique game, were given the message of their matched B-player, and were asked to chose between L and R at history h 0 in the game.
After the second survey month we randomly chose 50 payoff-wise unique games (i.e.
15% of the 328 games that had been completed by one B-and one A-player) and paid the participants that had played these games according to the decisions that they had taken in the game.
Data
Average values of π B (R) and π A (R) were 28.386e and 21.150e respectively. Moreover, average values of π B (l) and π A (l) were 17.184e and 25.899e while corresponding averages of π B (l) and π A (l) were 18.746e and 25.933e. Figure 5 illustrates the payoff variation of both players which follow from history h 1 in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 5 ]
In particular, we plot ∆π B = π B (r) − π B (l) and ∆π A = π A (r) − π A (l) for all 500 randomly chosen games. Games for which the payoff of player A is independent of player B's choice (i.e. ∆π A = 0) are denoted Invariant and are marked by full circles. All other games are denoted V ariant and marked by empty circles. We can see that the payoff differences for player A lie between -50e and 50e while payoff differences for player i vary between -35e and 35e.
Our data reveals that 70.45% of A-players (first movers) determined the final allocation by choosing the outside option. We perform a preliminary analysis of the decisions of B players by estimating a logit model relating the choice c at history h 1 (c ∈ {l, r} ) to the difference in payoffs of both players as well as to their respective outside options. In particular, we estimate the following equation
whereλ denotes a noise parameter. We find that the probability that B-players choose r increases significantly with ∆π A (α 1 = 0.160, se. = 0.043), suggesting that B-players take into account the well being of A-players. Not surprisingly, the size ofα 1 is substantially lower than 1, an indication that B-players value their own well-being more than that of others (given that the coefficient of ∆π B is normalized to 1). Interestingly, we do not find that any of the outside options have a significant impact on the decisions of B-players (α 2 = 0.103, p-value = 0.221;α 3 = -0.006, p-value = 0.928). Finally, we estimated an extended specification where we allowed the noise parameterλ to depend on ∆π B and
We found no significant increase in the log-likelihood function value (p-value = 0.9531), suggesting that the noise level does not vary with the payoff levels.
The proposed approach
To demonstrate our approach we focus on the strategic situation depicted in Figure 1 and in particular the decisions made by B-players. 6 We start by assuming that B-players in the population are motivated by belief-dependent preferences. In particular, our analysis 6 Note that our approach is not specific to the strategic situation presented in Figure 1 . It can also be used in connection with other two-player sequential-move games. The only requirement is that our is based on the following empirical specification of the utility of an alternative a 
used in the analysis of guilt aversion while
is used in the analysis of reciprocity. Our approach focuses on the case where researchers are able to specify the functional form of B(a, π, E B (E A (π A , π B ))), but do not have knowledge of the secapproach should be applied to the decision of a player in a "last" non-terminal history (i.e. a history directly preceding a terminal history) in which the player has to make a binary choice. 7 The existing literature on belief-dependent preferences assumes that people have preferences that are a function of their infinite hierarchies of conditional beliefs [see e.g. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)] about the strategies and beliefs of e.g. all other people that are part of the same strategic environment.
In contrast, for notational simplicity we define the psychological payoff B(·) directly via player B's belief concerning player A's belief about player B's and his own 'material' payoff
Of course, these second-order expectations depend on player B's belief concerning player A's belief concerning player B's strategy. For example, let α be player A's initial belief concerning the likelihood with which player B chooses l following his choice L -a feature of player A's first-order belief. Given this, 
ond order expectation E B (E A (π A , π B )) due to a lack of knowledge concerning player B's second-order belief.
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Our parameter of interest is ϕ(z) which measures the sensitivity of player B to his/her psychological payoff. Our approach can account for heterogeneity of ϕ(z) and λ(z) across players with different observable characteristics z. For notational simplicity we will suppress the dependance of ϕ and λ on z for the remainder of this section. Note that all the analysis in this section can be interpreted as being applied either to the entire sample population or to any of its relevant partitions defined by z. The empirical application presented in section 4 will assess the heterogeneity of ϕ and λ by comparing results using the entire sample population to those of seven different partitions of the population.
Assuming expected utility maximization, a B-player will choose to play r if
where
, and ∆ϵ = ϵ(r) − ϵ(l). Note that it is possible to construct the covariates in (2) given knowledge of π and E B (E A (π A , π B )). Estimation of (ϕ, λ)
can then be performed for example by assuming a specific distribution F (·) for −∆ϵ (eg.
normal or logistic). However, the lack of information on E B (E A (π A , π B )) prevents the construction of ∆B. This implies that ϕ is typically not point identified and thus standard binary choice estimators cannot be used to make inferences on ϕ.
Consider the case where ϕ ≥ 0. Moreover, let X contain all feasible values of the observable covariates [∆π, ∆B, ∆B] and x j = [∆π j , ∆B j , ∆B j ] denote an element of X. In our 8 By limiting the belief-dependent payoff to second-order expectations we restrict the type of belief dependent preferences that can be captured with our approach. The proposed approach however does not depend on this and can easily be extended to higher-order expectations. Furthermore, the most prominent models in the literature on belief-dependent preferences, reciprocity and guilt, can be captured by our setting.
application elements of X typically represent the payoffwise different games played the selected partition of the population. Then, it follows from (3) and the proof of Proposition 4 in Manski and Tamer (2002) that the following must hold for all x j in X
Inverting Pr(c = a|x j ) in (4) yields an equivalent and useful expression given by
where To characterize our main result, define the following 5 mutually exclusive dummy variables distinguishing the elements x j present in X
for all j and where 1 (A) denotes the indicator function taking a value of 1 when event A occurs, and 0 otherwise. Let Q j = F −1 (Pr(c = a|x j ))) and Then, the endpoints of the identification region are given by
= +∞ otherwise where
Notes. This proposition reveals that the identification region is given by the intersection 
Support condition (S) Pr(π Aj
(l) = π Aj (r)) > 0.
Noise condition (N) λ does not depend on π.
Condition I states that the difference between the psychological payoffs of player B from choosing l and r is zero if the payoffs of player A do not vary with the action chosen by player B. This condition holds for several important preferences discussed in the literature (see sections 3.1 and 3.2 below). Condition S is satisfied in our data by design -π A (l) = π A (r) holds for approximately 1/3 of our payoffwise different games. Condition N states that the noise parameter does not vary with the payoffs of the game. It can however depend on the observable characteristics of players. Condition N implies that the value of λ for games which satisfy condition S is the same as the corresponding noise level present in games with some payoff variation for player A. Supportive evidence for condition N can be obtained by estimating a reduced form version of equation (1), allowing the noise parameter to vary with the payoff levels, as done and discussed in Section 2.2. There we were unable to reject the null hypothesis that the level of noise varies with the final payoffs of both players.
10
Together, conditions I, S and N allow separate identification of λ. In particular, for preferences satisfying condition I, the choice probabilities for games satisfying condition S are given by
where the psychological payoffs drop out of the choice probabilities when condition I holds. Equation (11) can thus be used to estimate λ in a first step using the subset of elements of X for which π A (l) = π A (r). Estimation of the identification region [ϕ lλ , ϕ
can be performed in a second step conditional on the first step estimate of λ. We next discuss in detail two prominent examples of belief dependent preferences which can be analyzed using this two step procedure.
10 We are unaware of published empirical work showing that the noise level varies with the payoffs of players in similar experimental games . Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) 
Example 1: guilt aversion (ϕ ≤ 0)
Note that
where the lower bound ∆B = 0 is obtained when E B (E A (π A )) = π A (r), while the upper
. Inspection of (13) reveals that condition I is satisfied. It follows that all games are of the type 4 presented in (6). This implies that the set D defined in Proposition 1 is empty and thus ϕ 
3.2 Example 2: reciprocity (ϕ ≥ 0) Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) propose a model of reciprocity where the beliefdependent psychological payoff of player B is given by the product P K × K(a). The first term P K involves player B's perception of player A's kindness towards him in the game. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) 
As indicated above, the equitable payoff is used by player B as a reference point to measure the kindness of player A towards him. In particular, player B's perceived kindness of player A is given by the following difference
Expected payoffs E B (E A (π B )) higher (lower) than the equitable payoff are thus perceived as kind (unkind). The second term entering the psychological payoff function involves the kindness of player B towards player A when choosing l
A similar expression follows for K(r), the kindness when choosing r. It follows that ϕ(z) measures player B's willingness to pay to provide 1e to player A in return for 1e of perceived kindness.
Multiplying P K with K(l) and K(r) and rearranging gives
Differencing (16) and (17) yields
Inspection of (18) 
Values in (20) and (21) can be used to estimate the endpoints using (9) and (10).
Estimation and inference
We observe a sample drawn from the population of interest. The data available to 
Our approach can be applied separately to various partitions of the populations defined by z. In our application we divide our sample into various partitions and apply our estimation procedure on each partition as well as to the entire sample. We will separately analyze men and women, three education levels (low, intermediate, and high levels), and two age groups (below or above median sample age). Finer partitions potentially including other socio-economic variables or their interactions are in principle possible. However, our chosen partitions ensure that we have sample sizes which allow us to make meaningful comparisons.
We use (11) to first estimate λ by Maximum Likelihood for each parition considered by assuming that −∆ϵ follows a logistic distribution. Let λ denote the estimated value. The second step consists of estimating the endpoints of the identification region conditional on λ and the estimated values of Q j , denotedQ j . We obtain estimates of Q j by inverting estimated choice probabilities derived from the reduced form model in (1). In particular,
we use all N B−players to estimate Pr(c = a|x j ) for each x j in in X which do not satisfy condition S. We then generateQ j = F −1 ( Pr(c = a|x j )) for each x j .
Naïve estimators of the endpoints of the conditional identification region are given by the following sample counterparts to Proposition 1
where ϕ j and ϕ j are the estimated values of ϕ j and ϕ j defined in Proposition 1 (with the unknown value of λ replaced with λ). It is well known that the estimators (22) and (23) are possibly biased in finite samples. This reflects the fact that the expectation of the maximum (minimum) of random variables is generally higher (lower) than the maximum (minimum) of the expectations. We can thus expect ϕ lλ to have an upward finite sample bias while we can expect that ϕ lλ has a downward finite sample bias. This implies that naïve estimators based on (22) and (23) will tend to produce overly narrow conditional identification regions.
Chernozhukov, Lee and Rosen (2009) (hereafter CLR) propose a median-unbiased estimator of the endpoints of the identification region and propose a method to construct confidence intervals which can take into account the two step nature of our approach.
Here, we implement their approach for parametric models (see their appendix C.1). In particular, we define
where s(j) denotes the estimated standard error of either ϕ j or ϕ j , G(θ) denotes the estimated θ−quantile of max
represents a bias correction term which intuitively enters negatively in (24) 
Results for guilt aversion
We first assess what can be learned about the model parameters without exploiting the invariance condition. The grey area in Figure 2 We next exploit the invariance condition to make more precise inferences on ϕ u λ by replacing λ with a consistent estimate obtained in a first step using games which satisfy condition I. Table 1 Finally, the estimated one-sided 95% confidence intervals for ϕ u λ suggest that guilt aversion is significant for men, high educated players, and players above 47 years of age.
11 A positiveλ suggests that some B players chose the option providing them with the lowest payoff, given the payoffs of player A do not vary in games used to estimate λ. One interpretation of this result is that ∆ϵ i captures noise and sub-optimal decision making. Another interpretation is that part of ∆ϵ i captures unobserved preferences such as inequity aversion. Then, some players may be selecting the lowest payoff for themselves in order to reduce the payoff difference with player A. This would be consistent with results presented in Bellemare, Kröger, and van Soest (2008) who analyze responder behavior in the ultimatum game in the Dutch population. They found that a substantial proportion of responders were willing reject overly generous offers which provided them higher payoffs than proposers.
Results for reciprocity
We now consider the possibility that players have reciprocal preferences as outlined in section 3.2. Table 2 
Conclusion
Using stated beliefs to measure the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences on choices requires that researchers credibly control for the possibility that stated beliefs are correlated with unobserved preferences. We showed how researchers can now bound the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences on choices in sequential two-player games without exploiting information about the beliefs of players.
We obtained informative bounds for the causal effect of guilt aversion and reciprocity in our experiment. Our analysis of guilt aversion suggests that the population willingness to pay to avoid letting down the other player by 1e is significantly different from zero and at least greater or equal to 0.08e. We also found that the minimum amount that different groups of the population are willing to pay differs. In particular, high educated individuals are willing to pay at least 0.14e while men are willing to pay at least 0.16e to avoid letting down the other player by 1e.
Our analysis of reciprocity produced possibly the most revealing insight about the usefulness of our approach. We found that data on beliefs are not really required to make very precise inferences on the relevance of reciprocity in our setting. In particular, we were able to obtain very tight bounds on the causal effect of reciprocity on choices, suggesting that little more can be learned by exploiting data on the beliefs of players. Estimates for the entire sample suggested that players are willing to pay at most 0.031e to provide 1e to player A in return for 1e of perceived kindness. Similar results were found for all groups of the population we considered. These results suggest that players have weak reciprocal preferences.
These results can be interpreted as providing approximate bounds around the average sensitivity parameter for each partition of the population considered. Researchers may additionally want to conduct an individual-specific analysis to learn about the entire distribution of the relevant sensitivity parameter within each partition of the population.
Our approach can in principle be extended to make individual-specific inferences by exploiting data from subjects making multiple decisions in games satisfying condition I and games where payoffs of player A vary with the action taken by player B. Future work should also try to extend the approach to settings with more than two decisions as well as to settings where researchers are interested in combining data from different games.
The later could be particularly useful to separate the role of belief-dependent preferences from other motives (distributional concerns in particular) which can alternatively explain the observed behavior.
Our approach ultimately allows researchers to assess the added value of exploiting data on stated beliefs to learn about the relevance of belief-dependent preferences in games. Our analysis of reciprocity provides an example where little can be gained by further exploiting stated belief-data. Our results also suggests that this result is unlikely to hold in general. Estimated identification regions in the case of guilt aversion remain large despite revealing significant guilt aversion in various sub-groups of the population.
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